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The rise of medically unexplained conditions like fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome in 
the United States looks remarkably similar to the explosion of neurasthenia diagnoses in the late 
nineteenth century. In this paper, I argue the historical connection between neurasthenia and 
today’s medically unexplained conditions hinges largely on the uncritical acceptance of 
naturalism in medicine. I show how this cultural acceptance shapes the way in which we 
interpret and make sense of nervous distress while, at the same time, neglecting the unique social 
and historical forces that continue to produce it. I draw on the methods of hermeneutic 
philosophy to expose the limits of naturalism and forward an account of health and illness that 
acknowledges the extent to which we are always embedded in contexts of meaning that 





neurasthenia, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, somatization, naturalism, hermeneutics 
In 1881, New York neurologist George M. Beard published American Nervousness, Its Causes 
and Consequences: A Supplement to Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia). In this expansive work, 
Beard examined the explosive growth of affective and somatic symptoms emerging from 
“neurasthenia,” the deficiency or exhaustion of, what he called, “nerve force.” He identified a 
vast number of possible symptoms for neurasthenia including: neuralgia, dyspepsia, hay-fever, 
diabetes, sensitivity to narcotics and various drugs, depression, premature baldness, sensitivity to 
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cold and heat, tooth decay, chronic catarrh, infertility, hysteria, inebriety, fatigue, and impotence 
(Beard, 1881, vi-xi).1 Beard attributed the rise of neurasthenia both to a hereditary predisposition 
as well as the wrenching social upheavals of modernization in the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century, as large swaths of the post-Civil War population migrated from slow-paced 
rural communities to chaotic and bustling cities in the Northeast. With this movement, men 
abandoned their traditional vocations as manual tradesmen and farmers for new roles as workers 
in office buildings, and women left their stable domestic roles as wives and mothers to compete 
with men in universities and professional careers. Beard also cited the new technologies of 
industrialization such as the periodical press, the telegraph, telephone, and steam engine, as well 
as the ubiquity of mechanical clocks and watches that “compel us to be on time, and excite the 
habit of looking to see the exact moment” (p. 103).2   
 
These factors, taken together, contributed to the excessive strain on mental and physical life, and 
helped explain Beard’s claim that the “chief and primary cause” of neurasthenia is not the result 
of some new organic pathology but of “modern civilization [itself]” (p. vi). By the turn of the 
century, neurasthenia had spread to the other side of the Atlantic to Europe’s teeming urban 
centers.3 Influential cultural figures such as sociologist Max Weber and novelist Marcel Proust 
received the diagnosis, and neurasthenic characters became increasingly fashionable in the 
fiction of writers such as Edith Wharton, Theodore Dreiser, Henry James, and Thomas Mann. 
Indeed, the diagnosis became so common in the United States that philosopher William James 
referred to it as “Americanitis,” and the massive drugstore chain Rexall produced an 
“Americanitis Elixir” for the “man of business, weakened by the strain of [his] duties” (Osnos, 
2011).   
 
By the end of the Great War, due to its diagnostic vagueness, its unproven theory of “nervous 
energy,” and the ambiguous breadth of its symptoms, neurasthenia began to fall out of favor in 
the United States.4 But today we are seeing the symptoms of neurasthenia emerge once again in a 
proliferation of “functional somatic conditions” such as chronic fatigue syndrome and 
fibromyalgia. In this paper, I offer an account of the medicalization of neurasthenia and show 
how this process has undermined the original value of Beard’s work by failing to engage the 
socio-cultural forces through which neurasthenic symptoms emerged. Rather than viewing the 
neurasthenic from a narrow naturalistic perspective, as a discrete causally determined physical 
organism, Beard’s analysis views the neurasthenic in terms of, what hermeneutic philosophers 
such as Martin Heidegger would later call, “being-in-the-world,” a situated activity or way of 
                                                 
1 The ideas in American Nervousness emerged out of an earlier article of Beard’s (1869) entitled 
“Neurasthenia or nervous exhaustion.”  
2 George Simmel develops this point in his pioneering 1903 essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life” 
(1903/1997) by exploring the emotional costs of clock-time, where “punctuality, calculability, [and] 
exactness are forced upon life by…metropolitan existence.” (p. 177; see Aho, 2007)  
3 It is interesting to note that neurasthenia stretched across class and gender lines in a way that was unique 
among functional somatic conditions. It was diagnosed first among upper middle class women; then 
among “stressed out” middle class business men; and finally among the lower working classes before 
vanishing altogether from American medicine. (Gosling, 1987; Wessely, 1990) 
4 Although it eventually disappeared as a diagnostic category in the United States, the diagnosis continues 
to be applied in Europe and is still listed in the ICD-10, and it is used widely in countries such as Japan, 
Korea, China, Australia, and Russia.   
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being that is already involved and embedded in a meaningful socio-historical context. This 
situated activity not only shapes the way we experience, feel, and perform our bodies, more 
importantly, it informs how we interpret and give meaning to our nervous distress. Drawing on 
the insights of hermeneutic philosophy, I call into question some of the core naturalistic 
assumptions in medicine today. This questioning, in turn, makes it possible to interpret the toxic 
experiences of stress and nervous suffering from within the context of our contemporary ways of 
living. Which is to say, in effect, that modern medicine is often complicit in enacting and 
perpetuating the very pathologies it is seeking to treat. 
 
Neurasthenia and Naturalism: A Brief History 
 
The diagnosis of neurasthenia emerged against the backdrop of enormous successes in the 
natural sciences in the nineteenth century in areas such as anatomy and physiology, zoology, 
evolutionary theory, and in the emerging field of neurology of which George Beard was a 
pioneer. These successes contributed to the loss of religious authority and an increasing trust in 
the methods of natural science to explain and alleviate bodily suffering. This secular turn not 
only contributed to the emergent vocational prestige and cultural power of the medical 
professions, it also influenced the pervasive naturalistic paradigm that has fundamentally 
transformed the ways in which medicine interprets pathology.5   
 
Naturalism in medicine entails both an epistemological and a metaphysical assumption. From an 
epistemological standpoint, naturalism generally presupposes that the view of theoretical 
detachment and the objective procedures of empirical science are best suited to gain knowledge 
of the ailing body. From a metaphysical standpoint, naturalism assumes a position of physicalism, 
that all manifestations of sickness must be constituted in terms of physical substances in causal 
interaction and that these interactions can be quantified under mathematical laws of mass and 
motion (Ratcliffe, 2009). This paradigm creates the mechanistic and objectifying picture that 
characterizes medicine today, where a disease is considered legitimate or “real” only insofar as 
there is a measurable lesion or a deviation from normal functioning that is identifiable by 
anatomical or physiological-chemical observation.   
 
The result is a kind of biological reductionism, where pathology—including mental illness— is 
generally viewed as having a physical or bio-chemical origin. On this account, apropos of mental 
illness, the Dutch physiologist Jakob Moleschott wrote, “The brain secretes thoughts as the 
kidney secretes urine” (cited in Szasz, 2007, p. 47). This reductionism was evident in the way 
American medicine framed its understanding of nervous disorders at the end of the nineteenth 
century.6 Indeed, it could be argued one of the reasons that Beard’s account of neurasthenia 
became a diagnostic juggernaut is because it was viewed as “a physical, not a mental state” 
(Beard, 1881, p. 17). By 1900, neurasthenia had become the single most common diagnosis in 
the area of neuropathology and psychopathology (Shorter, 1992). By tracing its origin to a 
congenital weakness of the nervous system, Beard’s thesis made it “real” from the perspective of 
                                                 
5 This cultural shift was evident, for example, in the ways that various forms of social deviance earlier 
regarded as religious or moral failings by priests— such as alcoholism, depression, and homosexuality—
came to be medicalized by doctors in the twentieth-century (see Aho & Aho, 2008, pp. 65-70).   
6 It is important to note that medical treatment and the interpretation of disease in the United States tends 
to be far more reductive and mechanistic then other Westernized countries (e.g., Payer, 1989).  
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naturalism, and this gave it scientific legitimacy. Although many of its most pronounced 
symptoms were psychological— including crippling phobias, depression, panic anxiety, and 
compulsiveness—its status as a physical disease meant that the medical establishment could take 
sufferers seriously. It was not madness that triggered the “nervous breakdown,” but a 
physiological depletion of the body’s finite reserves of electrical “nerve force.”  
 
By removing the stigma of shame and fear associated with insanity, neurasthenia was often 
viewed positively: not only as a mark of a highly evolved and refined nervous system but of a 
man’s commitment to the Protestant values of industriousness and productivity or, in the case of 
women, of sensitive intellectual and literary proclivities. Emerging in the busy urban corridors of 
the East Coast, it was initially viewed as the signature disorder of middle and upper class “brain 
workers”— as opposed to rural “muscle workers”—whose focus and ambition could not match 
the frantic pace of a modern capitalist society. Physician George Drinka (1984) described the 
phenomenon in terms of a person  
 
with a nervous tendency [who] is driven to think, to work, to strive for success. He 
presses himself and his life force to the limit, straining his circuits.  Like an overloaded 
battery, or like Prometheus exhausted from reaching too high for the fire of the gods, the 
sufferer’s electrical system crashes down, spewing sparks and symptoms and giving rise 
to neurasthenia. (p. 191)  
 
In this way, neurasthenia provided both a scientifically legitimate (i.e., naturalistic, physical) and 
culturally accepted (i.e., burnout, overwork) justification for being sick (Abbey & Garfinkel, 
1991). Rather than being viewed as insane, treated by a psychiatrist (or “alienist’ as they were 
called at time because they dealt with those who were alienated or estranged from everyday life), 
and banished to the custodial care of the mental asylum, a prosperous neurasthenic could be 
cared for privately by a “real” doctor, a neurologist trained in general pathology and internal 
medicine, and given the standard somatic treatment of the time, namely, bed rest, a milk diet, 
electrical stimulation, and massage (Freedman, 1987; Shorter, 1997, pp. 129-136). This is how 
neurasthenia exploded in popularity at the turn of the century, becoming a “catch-all” diagnosis 
for anyone suffering from inchoate feelings of exhaustion, pain, anxiety, and nervousness. But 
almost as quickly as neurasthenia emerged as a diagnostic behemoth, it began to fade, eventually 
disappearing from American medicine altogether. This decline can be attributed to a number of 
overlapping factors.         
 
First, what contributed to the staggering popularity of neurasthenia also contributed to its 
precipitous decline, namely the sheer broadness of its definition. Beard identified over seventy-
five possible symptoms of neurasthenia with the result that virtually anyone could be diagnosed 
with the condition. In terms of neurasthenia-related phobias alone, he listed: “fear of lightning, 
fear of responsibility, fear of open places, fear of closed places, fear of society, fear of being 
alone, fear of fears, fear of contamination, fear of everything” (Beard, 1881, p. 7). As a result, 
“one found [neurasthenia] everywhere,” wrote a French author of the time, “in the salons, at the 
theater, in the novels, at the palace. By virtue of it, one explained the most disparate reactions of 
an individual: suicide and decadent art, adornment and adultery; it became the giant of 
neuropathology” (cited in Chatel & Peele, 1970, p. 37) The ubiquity of neurasthenia’s symptoms 
made the disorder virtually impossible to classify with any precision. In describing what he 
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called ‘the caprice’ of the condition, Beard acknowledged that, “sufferers often times wonder 
and complain that they have so many symptoms [because] their pain and distress attack so many 
parts and organs” (Beard, 1880, p. 76). This diagnostic ambiguity resulted in increasing 
skepticism in the scientific community, becoming “the garbage can of medicine” (Wessely, 1990, 
p. 47).  
 
The decline was also marked by the fact that neurasthenia’s medical advocates could not identify 
a specific organic or physiological cause. Beard’s belief was that it was a physical disorder of 
weakened nerve cells characteristic of a hereditary or congenital condition. The stronger one’s 
heredity, the more strain an individual could endure before succumbing to “nervous bankruptcy” 
and vice versa (Gossling, 1987, pp. 84-5). It was thought that the dramatic social, economic, and 
technological changes taking place in America at the time served as a trigger for those with a 
congenital weakness of “nerve force.” As Beard (1881) put it: 
 
The force in [the] nervous system…is limited; and when new functions are interposed in 
the circuit, as modern civilization is constantly requiring us to do, there comes a period, 
sooner or later, varying in different individuals, and at different times of life, when the 
amount of force is insufficient to keep all the lamps actively burning; those that are 
weakest go out entirely, or, as more frequently happens, burn faint and feebly—they do 
not expire, but give an insufficient and unstable light. (p. 99) 
 
The neurasthenic, in short, could not endure the physical and mental strain of a country that was 
“becoming rapidly Americanized.” The problem, of course, is that Beard’s thesis remained 
scientifically untestable. Yet, even though physicians could not find an organic cause for 
neurasthenia, they also could not deny that a condition existed that was overwhelming a large 
swath of America’s urban population, incapacitating individuals who were previously living 
successful and productive lives (Freedman, 1987).7  The question for physicians was whether or 
not it could be demonstrated that it was a single disease or if a more precise nosology could 
identify specific disorders that existed within this broad classification. And it was the issue of 
nosology that sealed neurasthenia’s fate. 
 
Neurasthenia, Psychiatry, and the Crisis of Validity 
 
In 1895, Sigmund Freud published a paper called “On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular 
Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description of Anxiety Neurosis.” This signaled one of 
the first attempts to provide a more rigorous system of classification, parceling out “anxiety 
neurosis” and “hysteria” from the general category of neurasthenia. Shortly thereafter, Freud’s 
contemporary Pierre Janet did the same with “compulsivity,” detaching it from neurasthenia. 
These diagnostic changes meant far fewer were suffering from the condition (Gossling, 1987, p. 
169; Wessely, 1990, p. 47). Although fin de siècle figures like Freud, Janet, and Jean-Martin 
Charcot were trained as neurologists and were still committed to the idea of the physical nature 
                                                 
7 Beard’s theory was further undermined by the discovery of hormones in 1902, which convinced 
physicians they had identified a specific causal agent—a chemical or hormonal imbalance that fit nicely 
into the mechanistic model of naturalism.  The problem with this early version of the “chemical 
imbalance” theory was that, although hormones certainly exist, it could never be demonstrated that they 
in fact caused nervous disorders (Chatel & Peele 1970). 
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of nervous disorders, they did not rely exclusively on the trademark somatic therapies of the day 
such as bed rest, electrical stimulation, massage, and water and thermal therapies.  They focused 
instead on mental processes or disorders of the mind, with the idea that the physical symptoms of 
neurosis might arise as the result of unconscious, usually libidinous, conflicts that emerged in 
early childhood. With this turn, “psychotherapy” (or the “talking cure”) was born as a way of 
verbally accessing long repressed sexual desires and fantasies. Using dialogical techniques such 
as dream analysis, free association, and transference, the therapist would help the patient become 
aware of their unconscious conflicts, and this awareness might free them of the physical 
symptoms of neurosis, demonstrating, in the words of one of Charcot’s students, “that the body 
could be cured by the mind” (cited in Shorter, 1997, p. 138). 
 
Although the “talking cure” became wildly popular with middle and upper class society in mid 
twentieth century America and was generally recognized by the medical establishment as 
offering legitimate therapeutic techniques to treat neurosis, its scientific foundations remained 
dubious. This is because psychoanalysis does not fit well into the empirical framework of 
naturalism. The assumption that an individual’s neurotic behavior could, for example, be 
explained in terms of repressed libidinous fantasies did not meet the objective standards of 
observation and testability that characterize empirical science. As opposed to somatic medicine, 
there is no way to physically locate, test for, or measure the source of repression or psychic 
conflict that manifests neurotic symptoms. Unlike physical abnormalities of blood, muscle, and 
bone, the abnormalities of the mind cannot be directly observed because, obviously, mental 
phenomena are not physical substances. The psychiatrist cannot point to an organic lesion or 
marker in the brain that secretes abnormal thoughts and emotions. As a result, they can only infer 
what a given mental disorder or abnormality is based on speculative theoretical assumptions, that 
is, on the metapsychology of the psychiatrist. But such inferences are unscientific precisely 
because they are impossible to empirically refute or falsify.  
 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, with advances in neuroscience, pharmacology, and 
genetic research, psychiatry attempted to regain a footing in the natural sciences by embracing a 
more empirical and biologically informed approach to mental illness. This new vision of bio-
psychiatry was framed by influential figures like Nancy Andreasen (1984) who wrote: 
 
The major psychiatric illnesses are diseases… They should be considered illnesses just as 
diabetes, heart disease, and cancer are…  caused principally by biological factors, and 
most of these factors reside in the brain… The brain is the organ of the body that serves 
to monitor and control the rest of the bodily functions, as well as providing the source 
and storehouse of all psychological functions, such as thoughts, memories, feelings, and 
personality. As a scientific discipline, psychiatry seeks to identify the biological factors 
that cause mental illness. The model assumes that each different type of illness has a 
different cause. (pp. 29-30) 
 
Central to this shift toward bio-psychiatry was a major revision by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) to the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. This involved a thorough rejection of the ideology and jargon of 
psychoanalysis with the aim of implementing a system of disease classification based on 
empirically observable symptoms. According to Robert Spitzer, the primary architect of the 
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DSM-III, this revision represented psychiatry’s return to medical legitimacy, “an advancement 
toward the fulfillment of the scientific aspirations of the profession” (cited in Lewis, 2006, p. 4). 
Key to this transformation was the elimination of the broad and ideologically loaded category of 
“neurosis” that was replaced with the more neutral medical term “disorder.” Henceforth, what 
was once neurosis was carved into seven more precise and reliable disease classifications, each 
with its own symptoms and diagnostic criteria: agoraphobia, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, simple phobia, and social 
phobia (Horwitz, 2002). 
 
Having addressed many of the affective dimensions of neurasthenia by eliminating neurosis, the 
DSM-III also addressed somatic dysfunctions. It did this by eradicating the archaic category or 
“hysteria’ and replacing it with a new diagnostic label, “somatoform disorder.” This was 
intended to identify those patients who presented with symptoms like chronic pain, dizziness, 
weakness, gastrointestinal issues, and fatigue, but had no demonstrable physical cause. For 
diagnostic precision, this category was also broken up into seven discrete disorders: body 
dysmorphic disorder, conversion, somatization, somatoform pain disorder, undifferentiated 
somatoform disorder, somatoform disorder not otherwise specified, and hypochondriasis 
(Lipowski, 1988). 
 
But discarding antiquated disease categories and the metapsychology of psychoanalysis for the 
sake of diagnostic precision did little to address the core issue of scientific validity; instead, it 
simply created more disorders. While the DSM-I (1952) was only 130 pages long and listed 106 
different disorders, the DSM-III was almost 500 pages long and contained 265 disorders, and 
DSM-V (2013) is 800 pages and describes nearly 300 disorders. Not only is there tremendous 
overlap or co-morbidity among these disorders (for instance, someone diagnosed with 
somatoform pain disorder could also present symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder, 
agoraphobia, and major depression, resulting in a patient having not just one but four distinct 
disorders), none of the disorders can be explained using the “gold standard” of pathology, 
namely, a physical marker in the brain. In other words, the hope that an empirically rigorous 
system of classification might help legitimize psychiatry as a medical science by providing 
“greater objectivity, diagnostic precision, and reliability” (USDHHS, 1999, p. 44) has proven to 
be an illusion. 
 
To this day, psychiatry has generally failed to demonstrate that behavioral, cognitive, and 
emotional abnormalities are the effects of biological diseases of the brain, this, in spite of the 
recent discovery of neurotransmitters and receptors, advances in genetics, and magnetic 
resonance technologies. Indeed, only in the most severe cases, such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder, is there any evidence at all of a biological (i.e., genetic) marker (Horwitz, 2002). For 
the vast number of nonpsychotic disorders listed in the DSM, the psychiatrist is left to make 
inferences, not on the basis of biology but on the basis of the observable behavior of the patient, 
their speech patterns, posture, facial expressions, and comportment. But what counts as abnormal 
in these respects are not medical (i.e., scientific); they are social, cultural, and religious (Szasz, 
2007). Psychiatrist, Nassir Ghaemi (2013), summarized the situation this way: “the leaders of the 
DSM [do not] believe there are scientific truths in psychiatric diagnosis—only mutually agreed 
upon falsehoods. They call it reliability” (n.p.). As a result, psychiatry continues to be regarded 
with suspicion and skepticism, even by its own practitioners, as “the dustbin of modern medicine” 
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(Wessely, 1990, p. 42). Sufferers of nervous disorders remain, as ever, haunted by the specter 
that what they experience is “imaginary,” “unreal,” or “in their heads.”  
 
In what follows, I suggest this enduring skepticism about psychiatry may shed light on the 
renewed interest in medically unexplained somatic conditions such as fibromyalgia and chronic 
fatigue syndrome that bear striking resemblances to neurasthenia. By emphasizing a somatic or 
non-psychiatric explanation of symptoms, the diagnosis creates the impression of medical 
legitimacy, of being “real.” I argue that, from a hermeneutic perspective, this is crucial for the 
narrative integrity and self-constitution of the sufferer. 
 
Hermeneutics, Somatization, and Medically Unexplained Syndromes 
 
One of the advantages of approaching questions of health and illness from a hermeneutic 
perspective is the way in which it reconfigures the traditional conception of the human being. 
Rather than viewing the human being in naturalistic terms, as a causally determined physical 
substance, hermeneutic philosophy sees it as an interpretive activity, where we exist in the 
narrative identities and self-interpretations that we create for ourselves. On this view, it is not an 
account of “what we are” as biophysical entities that is important, but “how we are,” that is, how 
we ceaselessly fashion and refashion our own being (or identity) as our lives unfold. This is why, 
when referring to the hermeneutic self, Heidegger wrote, “we are expressing not its ‘what’ (as if 
it were a table, house, or tree) but its being” (1927/1962, p. 180) This means that there is no pre-
given physiological essence that fundamentally determines who we are. On the contrary, what 
distinguishes us from non-human animals is the fact that we are “self-interpreting” (Taylor, 
1985), that is, we “create” or “understand” who we are by interpreting and giving meaning to our 
physiological givenness. As self-interpreting beings, when we suffer from nervous exhaustion, 
diffuse pain, and anxiety it is up to each of us to understand it, that is, to imbue those symptoms 
with the intelligibility and significance that they have.   
 
Moreover, the meanings we give to our suffering are always embedded in a particular socio-
cultural context. As a result, the hermeneutic self cannot be viewed as an encapsulated subject 
separate and distinct from an external world of objects (including other people). Rather, “self and 
world belong together. [They] are not two beings like subject and object …  Self and world are 
the basic determination of [human existence] itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 297). As an inter-subjective “being-in-the-world,” our 
interpretations are limited or constrained by the meanings made available by our situation. The 
world, on this view, opens up an array of possible ways for us to understand and make sense of 
our suffering. And because our interpretative context today is shaped so decisively by the 
paradigm of natural science, it is easy to see how the symptoms of neurasthenia are reborn in 
“functional somatic” conditions like fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome.8  Because we 
are so invested emotionally and cognitively in physical or somatic explanations for our nervous 
                                                 
8 In listing the symptoms of neurasthenia, Beard referred to “profound exhaustion,” “pains in the back,” 
and “heaviness in the loins and limbs” (1881, p. 7) which today could indicate a diagnosis of chronic 
fatigue syndrome. He cited “localized peripheral numbness and hyperesthesia,” ‘ticklishness,” “local 
spasms of muscles,” and “vague pains and flying neuralgias’ which fit the diagnostic profile of 
fibromyalgia (pp. 7-8) And he cited special idiosyncrasies with regard to “food,” “cramps,” “nervous 
dyspepsia,” and “indigestion” (pp. 7, 41) which resemble the symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome.   
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distress, it follows that under the auspices of naturalism, such explanations indicate the existence 
of something legitimate and “real.” This is why, as Robert Aronowitz cautioned, “[there is] a 
market for somatic labels… in the large pool of ‘stressed-out’ or somaticizing patients who seek 
to disguise an emotional complaint or to ‘upgrade’ their diagnosis from a nebulous (i.e. 
psychiatric) one to a legitimate disease.” (1991, p. 97) 
 
This process can be described as “somatization.” Not to be confused with the somatoform 
disorder in the DSM, somatization refers to a type of narrative construction or self-interpretation, 
where mental exhaustion, diffuse pain, anxiety, and stress arising largely out of the situated 
upheavals and emergencies of living are experienced and explained as a physical disorder, even 
when there is no evidence to support it (Lipowski, 1988).  
 
Consider the case of Linda.  
 
Linda had spurned previous recommendations for psychiatric counseling. She would not 
accept that she might have a psychiatric illness, and was angry, rather than relieved, when 
doctors implied that ‘Nothing is wrong with you’ and that ‘It is all in your head’. She was 
convinced that something was physically wrong, and she wanted [the doctor] to identify 
and treat that problem. (Young, 2003, p. 165) 
 
Although physicians would usually treat Linda’s condition as “psychosomatic,” as a somatic 
presentation of mental illness, for sufferers there is something deeply consoling when it is 
explained in physicalist terms. This is because it allows the patient to fashion a narrative that fits 
into the culturally accepted paradigm of naturalism. Even though “functional somatic” conditions 
are scientifically dubious (i.e., they cannot be traced back to an organic cause), the fact that they 
are regarded as physical explanations of their symptoms is often sufficient for the patient to 
construct an account of their suffering in a way that is not only intelligible but culturally 
legitimate. Fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, then, are not just useful diagnostic labels. 
For patients, they are symbols that reflect a specific cultural reality and help to create a 
meaningful identity. As Jerome Groopman (2000) claimed, “Of all the words a doctor uses, the 
name he gives the illness has the greatest weight…. With a name, the patient can construct an 
explanation of his illness not only for others but for himself” (n.d.).  
 
On the hermeneutic view, language and the words used in diagnostic medicine are expressive of 
a wider culture and are as rhetorically valuable as the physician’s stethoscope, syringe, or scalpel 
because it allows the patient to fashion an intelligible self-interpretation. This helps to sharpen 
the distinction between the biochemical aspects of “disease” and the subjective experience of 
‘illness” (Conrad, 1987). If the physician’s instruments treat and measure disease, language 
allows the patient to give meaning to the lived-experience of their unease. Where the language of 
spirits, sin, and guilt was expressive of the context of meaning that allowed people to make sense 
of their suffering in the middle ages, the language of naturalism and somatization is expressive of 
our context today. This helps explain why, instead of going to a psychiatrist for complaints of 
inchoate feelings of pain and fatigue, insomnia, racing heart, digestive problems, or difficulty 
concentrating, we instead go to a medical specialist to validate our experience. We seek an 
immunologist to receive a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome, a rheumatologist for a 
fibromyalgia diagnosis, a neurologist for tension headache, a cardiologist for atypical chest pain 
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and palpitations, or a gastroenterologist for irritable bowel syndrome. By medicalizing these 
symptoms, the patient feels validated, that there is a “real” cause to his or her suffering even if 
the physician does not see it this way (Barker, 2002; Hearn, 2009; Jimenez & Mayer, 2015).  
 
Thus, even though the majority of those labeled with fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue have an 
accompanying psychiatric disorder, and the treatment is often the same as the treatment for 
anxiety or major depression (e.g,. a combination of antidepressant medication, exercise, and/or 
some form of cognitive-behavioral therapy), patients generally favor a “functional somatic” 
diagnosis because it avoids the stigma of unreality associated with mental illness (Wessely, 
1990). The uncritical assumption underlying somatization, then, is that it is only a matter of time 
before an authentic biochemical “fact” can be found that directly causes the syndrome. And 
excitement builds in the medical community with the scientific discovery of each new cause, 
whether it is measurable deficiencies in neurotransmitters like serotonin and dopamine, low 
levels of somatotropin or growth hormone, or the poor sensory functioning of “substance P” 
(Groopman, 2000). But it is this assumption that is precisely what a hermeneutic approach to 
medicine calls into question. Even if such a discovery is made, it is still up to the sufferer to 
understand and give meaning to their own subjective experience on the basis of the interpretative 
resources made available by their world.   
 
Hermeneutic philosophy dissolves the traditional scientific distinction between objective “facts” 
and subjective “values.” From the standpoint of hermeneutics, there are no brute, value-less facts 
when it comes to human experience. As Charles Taylor wrote, such “a reductive explanation of 
human experience in physiological and ultimately in physical and chemical terms” is a denial of 
the qualitative meaning and value we attribute to our experience (1985, p. 47). In fact, on closer 
view, the allegedly neutral and objective explanations of biochemistry are themselves value-
laden insofar as they emerge against the background of a common language and are viewed by 
culture in qualitative terms as “valid” and “real.” We can make sense of our experiences only 
through the language that we grow into. Biomedical reductivism betrays this aspect of 
enculturation and the complexity and ambiguity of “being-in-the-world,” and this brings us back 




Although Beard’s theory of “nerve force” was scientifically unfounded, what makes it so 
relevant today is how it critically engaged the way of being unique to modernity. Instead of 
regarding the sufferer as a discrete object separate and distinct from his or her context and 
offering a biochemical account of physical and emotional exhaustion, Beard focused on the 
broad social and cultural upheavals taking place at the end of the nineteenth century, and he 
examined the possibility that simply existing amidst these upheavals might be unhealthy. By 
attending to the destabilizing social forces associated with turn of the century American life—
urbanization, industrialization, the insecurities of a market economy, new transportation and 
communication technologies, and the emerging dominance of clock-time—Beard recognized that 
neurasthenia was “an inevitable reaction from the excessive stain of mental and physical life” 
(1881, p. 83). As a physician, approaching questions of health and illness in a historically and 
sociologically informed way, he saw the obvious, that the human being is not an encapsulated 
material body but an interpretative way of being that is already bound up in a particular life-
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world, one that invariably shapes our emotional and physical health. Today, with corporate 
downsizing and outsourcing, increased productivity and efficiency measures, and overall 
economic insecurity combined with wearable technologies that keep us perpetually on alert, 
electronically tethered to work and to each other, Beard’s conclusion seems self-evident, that 
“nervous sensitiveness and nervous diseases ought to increase with the progress of modern 
civilization; and neurasthenia would naturally be more abundant in the present than in the last 
century” (p. 137).   
 
Beard’s account of the toxic effects of an over-stimulated, insecure, and mechanized existence 
not only reflects contemporary descriptions of American life as perpetually “overwhelmed,” 
“stressed,” and “burned out.” It also opens the possibility for a deeper analysis of the 
particularities of nervous distress. This is especially interesting as it pertains to issues of gender. 
Whereas for men, neurasthenia was once widely regarded as a mark of ambition and drive, “[an] 
acceptable and even an impressive illness… ideally suited to a capitalistic society and to the 
identification of masculinity with money and property” (Showalter, 1985, p. 135). For women, 
the situation is far more complex. Among those suffering from neurasthenia at the turn of the 
century, women were disproportionately represented. And today, the vast majority of those 
complaining of medically unexplained somatic conditions are also women, including ninety 
percent of all fibromyalgia sufferers (Groopman, 2000). Rather than attributing this 
overrepresentation to the idiosyncrasies of a woman’s reproductive organs and hormones, Beard 
took a broad hermeneutic view, focusing on the changing social roles and meanings for women 
in a new industrialized economy, her entry and acceptance into colleges and the professions, and 
her emergent vocational ambition and drive (Abbey & Garfinkel, 1991, p. 1643).  
 
Although criticized as a misogynist by regarding motherhood and domesticity as a woman’s 
natural state, 9  Beard’s view resonates to the concerns of contemporary feminist critics by 
exposing the limits of medicalization and drawing our attention to the concrete social and 
historical forces that produce and reproduce our nervous distress. This not only helps frame what 
Betty Freidan in the 1960s called, “the problem that has no name” (referring to the social 
conformism of the post-World War II American economy that pushed women into lives of empty 
domesticity resulting in “housewife neurosis” and its accompanying symptoms of fatigue, 
emotional irritability, and despair) (Shuster, 2011, p. 164). It also situates the gendered 
incarnation of fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome today as women struggle with rapidly 
changing social roles, busily trying to balance careers, family obligations, and personal 
ambitions all while confronting social obstacles like discrimination, lower pay, and sexual 
harassment. In this way, Beard’s account anticipates the relational complexity and ambiguity of 
our “being-in-the-world” later acknowledged in hermeneutic philosophy and creates an opening 
for health care professionals to adopt a more nuanced and contextualized perspective when it 
comes to the experience and interpretation of nervous suffering. While it is true that medicalizing 
nervousness creates a consoling sense of legitimacy by making it “real” under the paradigm of 
                                                 
9 Beard and his contemporary, neurologist S. Weir Mitchell warned against the educational, creative, and 
intellectual pursuits of women as they contribute to her nervous exhaustion. After prescribing his 
notorious “rest cure” for writer Charlotte Perkins Gilman, for instance, Mitchell implored her going 
forward to “live as domestic a life as possible. Have your child with you all the time… Lie down an hour 
after each meal. Have but two hours’ intellectual life a day. And never touch pen, brush or pencil as long 
as you live” (Gilman, 1975, p. 96, my emphasis.) 
Aho  Journal of Applied Hermeneutics 2018 Article 6    12 
naturalism, it fails to critically engage the historical context that made the paradigm possible in 
the first place. Hermeneutic medicine acknowledges our “being-in-the-world”; that we exist only 
in the social meanings we create for ourselves, and that it is only through these shared self-
interpretations that we can experience and make sense of our suffering.  
 
Compliance with Ethical Standards: This article does not contain any studies with human 
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